General Assembly at De AnzaThursday November 19 from 3:30 to 8:30pm on the Conference Room A&B.Every one is invited to attend, organizations and individuals.Come in and discuss how our unified plan for a Walkout/Day of Action against the Budget Cuts on March 4th will look like.

Building Peace in Afghanistan

 

By

Brandon Afrasiabi

Ernest Chavez

Ali Husain

Julianna Koopmans

Jake Parent

 

Edited by

Jake Parent

After eight years of having their military in the country it is amazing how little Americans know about Afghanistan.  More people than not would probably have a hard time even finding the country on a map let alone be able to understand what a diverse and dynamic group of people live there.  Such ignorance is typical in a country which is at war.  After all, it is much easier to allow bombs to be dropped on people who don’t have faces.  However, in order to reach the goal of having a secure, stable, prosperous, and sovereign country, the United States and its allies must stop reducing the situation into one of “us vs. them” and, instead, understand the history and the needs of the people as fellow human beings and that by addressing these issues we can work together to create a better world.

Afghanistan is known for its steep sloped mountains and harsh terrain.  However, within the mountain ranges there lie many fertile valleys and plains.  In the southern region there are great stretches of desert.  The country is approximately the same size as France and, as of May 2009, has a population of about 33.5 million people.  Of these 33.5 million, 42% are Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, and 13% are of a large number of other groups.  Afghan Persian (also known as Dari) is spoken by 50% of the people and is one of two official languages along with Pashto which is used by 35% of the population.  Turkic languages such as Uzbek and Turkmen make up 11% and there are 30 additional minor languages, primarily Balochi and Pashai, which make up the last 4%.  In addition, there are countless dialects and bilingualism is common. (CIA) Hazaras are Shi’a Muslims, which is the minority in Afghanistan, with about 80% being Sunni.  Afghanistan is filled with tribal rivalries and poverty, neither of which respect the territorial rule of law nor the sovereignty of state boundaries. (Akhtar, 2008)

Founding an Afghan State

Largely as a part of British colonization, the first attempt to make Afghanistan a nation came at the end of the 19^th century when Abdurrahman Khan installed Pashtun groups in non-Pashtun regions forcing a sort of artificial nationality and fueling tension between tribes.  In 1919, after Amir Amanullah had Afghan forces attack the North-West Frontier, Britain, who was worn out by the World War, granted Afghanistan full independence.  As the 20^th century went on, Amanullah was focused on the modernization of Afghanistan but was deposed and exiled in 1929 after a revolt led by a Tajik bandit.  The revolt was short lived and the Pashtun aristocracy soon returned to power.

In 1947, when India gained its independence, Afghans had to choose between India and the new Pakistan.  However, Pashtuns wanted a separate “Pashtunistan”.  Ethnic minorities were not especially happy with this idea and relations with Pakistan suffered.  Into the 1960s and 70s, Afghans had support from the Soviets and the Indian governments because of America’s support of Pakistan.  Also, when the Afghans requested help in the form of equipment for their armed forces, only the Russians were willing to step in. (Carter)

The early 1970s had found the Afghan government building many schools and institutes of higher learning.  Unfortunately, the country was 95% peasant agriculture and the new educated class had nowhere to fit in.  Members of Parliament typically fought only for what benefited their own community and themselves.  Parliament became totally ineffective, political parties weren’t allowed, and looming around the corner was a coup. In 1973 a coup d’etat took place when two Soviet trained colonels deposed King Zahir Shah and installed Daud Khan as President of the Republic.  Accompanying him were a group of Communist ministers armed with reform programs.

In the universities, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was spreading their influence while an Islamist (desire for an Islamic state) movement also grew.  Having support from the Communists, Khan took little interest in Islam.  However, Daud began to disappoint his allies as his policies became more Pashtun-Centered.  In 1978, they had had enough and, this time, the coup was far from bloodless.  The guards, Daud, and his family were all murdered.  The leaders were the same members of the PDPA who had been involved in the 1973 coup.  A revolution and reforms were what the PDPA was striving for, but it was not what they got.

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased greatly in 1978 with the USSR supporting the fledgling Communist government which was besieged by anti-government rebels. The PDPA instituted a series of progressive reforms and modernization within the country which succeeded in abolishing many of the religious foundations and customs, establishing schools for girls, adopting western style liberties, and rebuilding Afghan infrastructure.  Along with these social reforms, they also implemented a communist style structure of governance and compliance.  These progressive reforms were seen as anti-Islamic by the religious clergy, imams, and devout Muslims throughout Afghanistan, and sparked violent resistance towards pro-government forces and officials.  In response, the PDPA took a heavy handed approach.  They used military might to crush the insurrection but such efforts quickly culminated in even greater violence as the majority of the population took up arms in resistance. (CIA, 1985)

Further pressure and attacks from the Mujahedin rebellion prompted the PDPA to appeal for military assistance from the USSR.  Support of the Afghan Communist government was a driving incentive for the Russians to enter the country.  This was not only a move to support the PDPA but one of global strategic importance as they attempted to establish communist rule and influence within the region.  The Cold War was at its peak and the battlefield of the two great super powers would  be in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan.  Instead of direct confrontation—a dangerous prospect for two nuclear armed countries—the war was being fought, as it had been in other parts of the world, through proxies.

The Soviets invaded on December 25^th 1979, an operation which involved over 30,000 troops and eventually grew to over 100,000.  Major operations and battles were fought throughout the country with the Mujahedin resistance operating mainly in the rural areas and in the mountainous regions near the Pakistan border while the Russians controlled the major population centers.  The USSR and PDPA had little influence or control outside the cities, leaving their supply lines open to the frequent Mujahedin guerrilla style hit and run tactics which devastated and frustrated the Russians.  The war steadily escalated with increasing military involvement and subsequent casualties. (U.S. Army, 1989)

The Mujahedin was supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan who provided training, weapons, and funding.  Notably, the US supplied the Mujahedin with advanced surface-to-air Stinger missiles which had the capability of neutralizing or limiting the Russian’s murderous close helicopter air support.  The USSR, no longer able to provide cover for its ground operations, was thus limited in the mobility of its forces.  The war turned into a stalemate with neither side gaining any strategic advantage.  Ultimately the will of the Russian people faded in support of this grizzly war that had taken away so many young Russian lives with seemingly no progress or hope of success. (American political science review 2003)

Soviet Forces pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989 leaving behind a fractured state and the PDPA left to deal with its own security but the Kremlin still supported them  by providing arms and financing.  No longer, though, would the USSR commit any ground forces to direct security operations within Afghanistan.  The PDPA was able to survive the continued assaults by the Mujahedin for another 2 years.  However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and their support, the PDPA military leadership abandoned the weakened government and defected to the Mujahedin who finally overtook the city in the spring of 1992.

The war left Afghanistan with severe political, economic, and ecological problems.  More than 1 million Afghans died in the war and 5 million became refugees in neighboring countries.  In addition, 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and 37,000 wounded.  Economic production was drastically curtailed, and much of the land lay wasted.  At the end of the war more than 5 million mines saturated the country and the people were left without hope or any sense of identity.

Civil War

The civil war erupted directly after the capture of Kabul from the PDPA government in 1992 and would rage on for four years.  The Mujahedin, who successfully united to combat the Soviets and the PDPA, proved unable to unite under the banner of freedom now that they did not have a common enemy to fight.  The Mujahedin fractured into competing factions creating a bloody civil war that ravaged the country yet further.  These political divisions set the stage for the rise of the Taliban.

The political and military vacuum in the country, the loss of hope in the      mujahidin parties, political fragmentation, and chaotic economic and security    conditions all played significant roles in the popularity of the Taliban… Their           success is partly based on religious sympathy and anti-American sentiment, but is mainly due to popular disenchantment with the nationalist and mainstream        political parties. Pro-Taliban feelings still run deep in Pakistan and well beyond      the Pashtun territories. (Akhtar, 2008)

The Taliban

The Taliban are primarily Sunni Pashtuns and were loosely organized on a regional basis during the civil war, despite representing a potentially huge force.  They didn’t emerge as a united entity until the Taliban of Kandahar made their move in 1994. During their reign (1996-2001), they had controlled over 90% of Afghanistan’s territory. Led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, their main focus was to enforce Sharia law, but, in actuality, they only enforced certain aspects which oppressed the population at large and helped keep the Taliban in power.

The people accepted the Taliban in the beginning because they eliminated corruption, restored peace, and allowed commerce to resume. After twenty years of war, the people were desperate for order and calm.  However, the more power the Taliban gained, the stricter they became.  Men were required to wear beards and were subject to beatings if they did not.  Women were prohibited from going to school, working outside the home, and could not leave their home without a male relative.  If they did so they could be beaten or even shot.  The drug trade has been a major source of income for the Taliban, providing about 75% of their total funding.  Despite a protracted drought and ongoing war, Afghanistan remains the world’s top producer of opium.  (Mother Jones; May/Jun2009)

The rule of the Taliban was only recognized on the international level by three countries: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the UAE.  Their primary opposition came from the Northern Alliance headed by Ahmad Shah Massoud.  This alliance was made up of Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and Turkmen.  The Taliban was supported by the foreign fighters living within Afghanistan who had formed the Mujahidin resistance against the USSR and had subsequently transformed into Al-Qaeda.

Al Qaeda

Al-Qaeda, in Arabic, means “The Base”. The Al-Qaeda movement began during the fight against the Soviet Occupation.  They were primarily Arab fighters from countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Syria.  The founder and financier for this movement is Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national from an elite family.  His second in command is Ayman Al-Zawahiri who also serves as the theologian and philosopher, driving the movement’s ideology.  He is believed to be the person who actually holds most of the power in Al-Qaeda because, unlike Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri can issue fatwa’s (religious decrees).  Some compare his power in Al-Qaeda to the influence Dick Cheney had on President Bush.

The primary goal for Al-Qaeda has been to drive out any American and western influence in the Muslim world, especially in Saudi Arabia as it is home to the two holiest cites in Islam, Mecca and Medina.  Their goals have come and are influenced by the writings of extremist such as Mohammad ibn abd Al-Wahhab (founder of Wahabism), and Sayyid Quitib of Egypt (whose brother taught Osama Bin Laden).  These two writers were known to have strict interpretations of Islam and many consider them to  have twisted the words of the Quran.  Things such as the killing of civilians and suicide bombings, which have no bearing in the Quran, were made to be a way to achieve martyrdom (the highest honor a Muslim fighter can hope to achieve).

These ideas had almost no followers before the 1980s but grew tremendously during that decade and continued to flourish in the 1990s as Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda preached them wherever they went.  Groups following these teaching have been found in places as distant as the Philippines, Algeria, Eritrea, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Kashmir.  What made Al-Qaeda like no other militant group was that the fighters following their ideology did not have to answer to a hierarchy.  They can do whatever they wanted as long as they are Sunni Muslim.  They believe if you are not of the Ahul Sunna (another way of saying Sunni Muslim) you are considered a Kafir (non-believer).  Attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 were examples of actors who follow the ideology of Al-Qaeda but are not answering directly to any specific chain of command.  Followers in Iraq such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and now Abu Ayyub al-Masri have also shown that Al-Qaeda can no longer be thought of as an organization, but must be conceptualized as an idea or philosophy.  In late 2001, the philosophy of Al-Qaeda would be demonstrated to the world.

9/11 and the US Response

On September 11th 2001, 19 Islamic terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda hijacked 4 commercial jets and crashed them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.  The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, near Washington, D.C. and a fourth into a field near Shanksville in rural Pennsylvania.  The attacks ultimately killed 2,974 people while leaving the island of Manhattan a smoldering ruin and the world in a state of panic.  Most of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt, and one from Lebanon.  This was the worst terrorist attack in history and would spark the Global War on Terror and the invasion of Afghanistan.  (“The 9/11 commission report”)

In response to the events, and after rejecting offers from the Taliban, on October 7, 2001 to try Bin Laden in an Islamic court, the Bush Administration commenced air strikes against Afghanistan without authorization from the United Nations.  After seven days of bombing, the Taliban offered to try Bin Laden in the courts of a third-party country but the U.S. government rejected the offer and George W. Bush declared, “There’s no need to discuss innocence or guilt. We know he’s guilty”.   The speed and hastiness with which the Bush Administration reacted, coupled with a UN/World Bank/Asian Development Bank consultation held two weeks after the Taliban was ousted, has called into question the intentions of the U.S. led invasion.  Many in the world have been left asking whether or not there was ever any real intention to build a sound and democratic Afghan nation. (Barakat 2002, 9).  As the war inches ever closer to the decade mark, the presence of US troops, as with the Russians before them, has become less and less tolerable to the people of Afghanistan.

Losing Hearts and Minds

Beginning with the ground invasion in 2001, Afghanistan has been placed under an occupation by U.S. and coalition forces.  During this time, one of the most pressing issues has become the use of foreign military forces against Afghan civilians.  Much of the violence against civilians comes as a result of the inability of American troops to tell apart Afghan civilians from Taliban and the resulting conflation of the two.  The U.S. has taken a rigid stance against terrorism, signing all of the major international anti-terrorism conventions (Fraser 2005, 13); the government has also labeled all Taliban as “terrorists,” not “soldiers”.  This label implies a different set of rules for engagement by the occupation forces.  The inability of the troops to tell apart civilians from Taliban, combined with the labeling of all Taliban as “terrorists,” has created a dangerous situation for Afghan civilians.

The use of military force against innocent Afghans has become an all too common problem.  On January 25, 2008, the New York Times reported on an incident near Ghazni in which nine Afghan police officers and one civilian were mistakenly identified by American troops as being Taliban and were consequently shot and killed.  More recently, the New York Times reported an incident on May 4^th of 2009, in which the U.S. forces engaged Taliban in Farah province, and resorted to air strikes which murdered innocent people.  The U.S. military claimed to have killed “60–65 Taliban” and “at least 20–30 civilians”.  However, the Times reported that when the International Red Cross investigated the same situation, they found that not only had 140 civilians been killed, 93 of them being children, but also that the bombings had taken place hours after the Taliban had vacated the area.

In 2008, the U.S. increased their air strikes by 31%.  This dependency on air strikes has led to increased rates of violence toward civilians (Joshua 2007).  Thus far, the U.S. led occupation has created a dangerous situation for Afghans and, in turn, has failed to bring stability to Afghanistan.  Because the invasion was originally carried out without U.N. authorization, animosity from the international community towards the U.S. has also skyrocketed.   In addition, the failed occupation has helped the Taliban to carry out well-organized ambushes against foreign troops and to regain the support of Afghans.  With President Barack Obama’s recent announcement of moving 60,000 U.S. troops into Afghanistan for a surge, the anti-American sentiment is growing stronger than ever.

Peace Making vs. Peace Building

 

The present strategy being used by the United States military and other coalition forces is considered in this paper to be “peace making”.  That is, using aid, military, and diplomatic strategies concerned with pacification and not necessarily the long term benefit of the people.  This strategy is not only ineffective in that it does not provide any foundation for long term growth, but is also counter productive.  By choosing not to address the basic needs of the people, resentment has continued to build up and has further distanced local Afghans from working with and accepting the coalition’s presence.

The primary facilitators of peace making efforts in Afghanistan are the military’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  These groups consist of soldiers and civilian contractors who work together to develop and implement aid strategies consistent with the goals of the military.  They are mostly concerned with the construction of projects which increase access for military units and open up available operational space.  They build roads, for example, which, while also allowing for ease in citizen trade, are mostly provided as a way to drive in humvees and other military vehicles.  All the while, the people are wondering when those roads will bring food to fill their hungry bellies. (Shannon 2009)

While US troop presence in a particular province gives way to a short term lessening of violence, it does not address the systemic problems which concern the people of Afghanistan in their efforts towards long term peace.  In order to do so, the strategy must be to move towards peace building.  This is defined as

Local or structural efforts that foster or support those social, political, and institutional structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful          coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or           continuation of violence. (Goodhand 2002)

The enemy in Afghanistan is not just some specific military force where one side can kill the other and expect to win.  It is, instead, an idea which can only be conquered by another idea or, more specifically, a better way of doing things.  It must be understood that, in the long term, no society can be expected to develop those tools with which to create a secure, stable, prosperous, and sovereign country without having their basic needs met.  Any successful strategy in Afghanistan must have, as its base, a multi track plan for providing security, food, shelter, and education for its people.

Security

 

There is a pressing need for physical security in Afghanistan.  It is not difficult to see that there is little hope of developing long lasting institutions without it.  As we have seen in this report, violence has continued to escalate as the Taliban continues to reconstitute.  Each civilian casualty as a result of coalition violence will continue to spawn additional recruits for Taliban commanders.  It has been shown time and time again that western forces do not have the training and know how to successfully differentiate between friend and foe.  Therefore, direct combat by coalition military forces has become counterproductive and these duties must be placed in the hands of the Afghan National Army (ANA).  (Shannon 2009)

As of March 2009, the ANA counted 82,781 members and growing.  It is ready to begin taking over primary security duties.  In order to ensure a reasonable transfer, all US and coalition military bases should be set to transfer to the control of the ANA on a six month time table.  After which, the sole role of US forces will be in training ANA recruits as they begin a total withdrawal during the following six months following the base transfer.  By this time, it is estimated that there will be 134,000 trained Afghan troops. (Afghan Conflict Monitor)

The primary role for the Afghan National Army will be in combating a growing illegal arms and drug trade, as well as giving the state a monopoly on the means to create violence.  In addition, the ANA provides well paying jobs and by recruiting from different ethnic groups, it provides an institution which can serve as a symbolic foundation for national pride and identity.  This gives the nation ownership in growing an idea of an Afghanistan which is for and by Afghans.

Similarly, within the cities will be the Afghan National Police (ANP) which numbered 80,365 as of March, 2009.  They will play a role in helping to quell the trade of opium, human trafficking, arms, and other illicit markets which damage Afghan society. (Afghan Conflict Monitor)  The current counternarcotics strategy implemented by the Afghan government and coalition forces is to eradicate the plant where it grows.  What they fail to take into consideration is that the poppy farmers depend on the income derived from the production and sale of poppy which has a value of about $200 per batch compared to about $2 for wheat.  This is a serious problem that must be addressed with alternative crop solutions and livelihood programs that would help wean Afghan farmers off opium cultivation while providing them with viable economic solutions.  The interdiction of the opium en route to their final destinations (refineries, black market, etc.) via organized crime syndicates and the Taliban is also crucial in combating the Taliban’s financial foundation.  Only, though, when farmers are given alternative solutions can Afghan forces begin to enforce a poppy ban and eradicate or severely limit its production.  (Foreign Policy; Sep/Oct2008)

The most important job the ANP have, however, is in community building.  In order to avoid creating an “us vs. them” mentality, the members of a neighborhood, city, and region’s police forces should come from within their jurisdiction.  It is crucial that they understand the ins and outs of the ultra complex and varied Afghan cultural structures.  This knowledge will allow them to be entrenched and have a distinct and definite stake in the well being of the communities they are working in.

The security track of the solution should itself be based on attacking and solving more than one problem at a time.  Not only will it seek to eliminate both the detrimental social ills inherent in such a brutalized society and provide physical security but also to provide income for its members and a sense of pride, loyalty, and a shared goal for the communities they represent.  While security is being stabilized and an identity being forged, aid can finally begin to have an effect on providing for the fundamental needs of the population.

Aid That Works

            Regardless of what efforts are undertaken in the arena of security, no long lasting peace can be realized when the people are starving.  As discussed earlier, the previous iterations of Taliban rule were, in fact, brought on because of a desperation which had become intolerable.  In such horrendous times as were seen during the 1990s civil war, anything was seen as a positive alternative.  So, to provide an alternative to such regimes is to provide a better answer on going about the crucial role of providing for the basic needs of the people.

The PRTs have essentially eliminated the ability for NGOs to provide aid which is autonomous from the military and thus all aid has come to be seen as a form of manipulation to the Afghan people. (Shannon 2009) Because the PRTs’ aid (and consequently all other aid as well) is viewed as so closely tied to military goals, a rejection of it has developed by Afghans as a means of defending against military intrusion.  The line between aid workers and military soldiers is so blurred so as to be left undecipherable by native Afghans.  As one tribal leader put it

You can not tell the difference between our tribes, so how can you expect us to     tell the difference between yours. As far as we are concerned they are all foreign           soldiers… and they are in our country. (Shannon 2009)

Traditionally, NGOs have been able to operate with a high degree of autonomy from politics and with an emphasis on addressing the needs of the people.  In Afghanistan they have, however, been forced in recent times to stray from this role.  They are being forced into working with the PRTs in order to gain access to the humanitarian space in which both operate.  This has further added to the confusion of where the military ends and aid groups begin.  (Bristol 2006)

Although the PRTs are relatively small (23 PRTs for 34 provinces and no more than 300 personnel per province), they have an enormous amount of say in the total control of development strategy.  $796 million was spent in the 2005-06 fiscal year on the type of projects which most NGO activities fall under.  Of that amount, only $200 million was actually spent through NGOs.  This has led to a distinct disproportion in the goals of aid with the bias being towards short term pacification rather than food aid and the sort of long term institution building needed to create a thriving nation. (Shannon 2009)

In order to have effective aid it must be given by groups autonomous of non-Afghan interests.  Aid must be given through Afghan NGOs wherever possible and primarily funded by a worldwide grassroots effort which will focus on individual donors giving small amounts in large numbers.  Doing so will maintain autonomy and contribute to an important humanizing of the Afghan people by allowing the world to develop a better understanding of who they are.

Building Institutions and a National Identity

 

The third track, and the long term solution to creating a secure, prosperous, peaceful, and sovereign Afghanistan, is the creation of Afghan institutions.  In order to ensure cultural, economic, and social growth, the Afghan people must be allowed to autonomously build up the respective mosques, markets, and schools in which such societal capital is born and nourished.  By employing a pluralistic model in forming these institutions, the country can begin to create and add to the sense of national pride and unity begun in the efforts of the other areas discussed.

A prominent observation made by many visiting foreigners (including Afghans not from Afghanistan) is that there is no sense of “normal”.  Everything is based around a life of survival which is inherently chaotic.  To begin providing some semblance of normalcy, the Afghan people must begin to work together to restore their rich history and culture.  In order to create a cohesive goal, representatives of different ethnic groups will have to travel the country in order to opine the needs of their region as well as, and most importantly, listen to the needs of others.  By getting to know each other they will learn that the differences that individual ethnic groups have been convinced are so important are actually quite insignificant in comparison to the similarities born out of the common humanity, struggles, and experiences all Afghans have been going through for decades.

Once the needs of the people have been acknowledged and understood, the country, together as a whole, will finally be able to begin the process of creating an Afghanistan for Afghans.  For the first time ever, the needs and interests of the whole will be recognized as not being mutually exclusive to those of the few.  When this truth is realized within Afghanistan, it will not only be a victory for those who live in this far away land but for the entire global community as well.     

Works Cited soon to be added..

building-peace-in-afghanistan-final-paper2.doc

By Jack Cody
8 August 2009

A US Army
Specialist and veteran of the war in Iraq will face jail time for
refusing to deploy to Afghanistan. The non-commissioned officer objects
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on principle, claiming the US
military occupies both countries in violation of international law.

Spc.
Victor Agosto, 24, from Miami, served a 13-month tour in Iraq with the
Army’s 57th Battalion. Although his four-year enlistment should have
ended August 4, Agosto received orders in May to report to an Army
office to begin the paperwork for overseas deployment to Afghanistan.
He was informed that his military service was to be involuntarily
extended under the “stop-loss” program.

When he received his
reporting orders, Agosto wrote a letter refusing deployment. “There is
no way I will deploy to Afghanistan,” wrote Agosto. “The occupation is
immoral and unjust. It does not make the American people any safer. It
has the opposite effect.”

 Read the full article here…

US: Economic crisis forces families to cut back on healthcare

By E. Galen
26 January 2009

• An October report by the Kaiser Family Foundation stated that nearly half of Americans said a family member has cut back on medical care or skipped pills in the last year because of costs.

• The American Hospital Association reported in November that among 736 hospitals nationwide, 30 percent saw a decline in elective procedures and nearly 40 percent had a drop in admissions overall because of the economic downturn.

• A study by the AARP released in December stated that 15 percent of adults in the US have decreased medications or not filled a prescription because they could not afford the medicine.

See Full Article

They got money for RACIST I.C.E. but no money for Education. Read:

11/20: $44+ million contract for Northrop-Grumman for ICE detainees

Department of Homeland Security Awards Immigration and Customs Enforcement Infrastructure System Task Order to Northrop Grumman

MCLEAN, Va., Nov 20, 2008 (GlobeNewswire via COMTEX) — Northrop Grumman Corporation (NOC:
Northrop Grumman Corporation

NOC 36.45, +2.25, +6.6%) has been awarded a task order by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide an infrastructure system and commercial, off-the-shelf solution for bed space, transportation and detainee location tracking (BST&T) that will significantly increase safety and security, reduce processing time, minimize network and cellular traffic, and provide a common interface for DHS agents. DHS awarded the task order against the Enterprise Architecture Gateway for Leading Edge Solutions (EAGLE) Information Technology services contract vehicle.

The BST&T task order consists of a one-year, $14 million base period, with three one-year options for a total potential value of $44.35 million.

Under the terms of the task order, Northrop Grumman’s Information Technology sector will provide DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations with an integrated system that will locate and track detainees, reserve detainee bed space among various facilities, and manage detainee transportation. Northrop Grumman will provide the infrastructure and integrate this system with other DHS systems and solutions.
“The team brings a depth of implementation experience needed for the BST&T system,” said Al Pisani, vice president for mission applications and IT infrastructure for Northrop Grumman’s Information Technology sector. “Our extensive knowledge of law enforcement applications and infrastructure tools make us uniquely capable to develop this significant capability.”

The solution provides commercial off-the-shelf integration with a tailored Web portal linking the systems together. During the first phase of the task order, the team will develop and deploy a wireless network infrastructure at detention facilities that will initially be used for detainee tracking and will be able to support evolving technology needs. Also during this first phase Northrop Grumman will deploy the central reservation capability.

“This key win helps to further expand Northrop Grumman’s expertise within DHS,” said Jerry Buckwalter, Northrop Grumman’s vice president of homeland security. “This project will help us continue our mission-focused approach to providing innovative solutions that ensure the most effective response to the Department’s needs.”

Work under the task order will take place in McLean, Va.

Northrop Grumman’s teammates include SoftBrands, Minneapolis; System Analytics, Inc., Fairfax, Va.; CoSolutions, Inc., Reston, Va.; Alanco/TSI Prisim, Inc., Scottsdale, Ariz.; Cogent Systems, Pasadena, Calif.; Cross Match Technologies, Palm Beach Gardens, Fla.; Dell Inc., Round Rock, Texas; IBM, Armonk, N.Y.; and Oracle Corporation, Redwood Shores, Calif.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense and technology company whose 120,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in information and services, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding to government and commercial customers worldwide.
This news release was distributed by GlobeNewswire, www.globenewswire.com
SOURCE: Northrop Grumman Corp.

Juli Ballesteros
Northrop Grumman Information Technology
(703) 556-2736
juli.ballesteros@ngc.com